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4. Statement showing jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
Defendant/appellee United States Automobile Association 
(hereinafter "USAA") agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction of 
plaintiff/appellant Russell P. Calame (hereinafter "Calame"). 
5. Statement of the issues. 
USAA has no disagreement with Calame's Statement of Issues. 
6. Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, and rules. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances or rules. 
7. Statement of the Case. 
a. Nature of the case. 
Karen Burns McCoy sued Russell P. Calame in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (the 
"underlying action"). Calame had a homeowner's policy and an 
umbrella policy with USAA. Calame tendered the defense of the 
McCoy suit to USAA. USAA denied the tender, relying on the 
business pursuit exclusions in the policies. Calame sued USAA. 
USAA answered and counterclaimed for declaratory relief on, inter 
alia, the business pursuit exclusions. 
b. Course of the proceedings. 
USAA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
business pursuit exclusions. Calame filed a cross-motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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c. Disposition at trial court. 
The lower court granted USAA's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered judgment finding that Calame had no coverage 
under the policies and that USAA had no duty to defend Calame. 
&. Statement of the facts. 
The following facts were set forth in USAA's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and were not disputed by Calame: 
1. Karen Burns McCoy filed a Complaint in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah against Russell P. Calame and others. (Hereinafter, "the 
underlying action"). A true and exact copy of McCoy's Complaint 
is attached to Calame's Complaint herein. (Record at 2-43.) 
2. Russell P. Calame is, subject to their definitions, 
terms, conditions, and exclusions, an insured under the USAA 
Homeowner Policy and the USAA Umbrella Policy attached to 
Calame#s Complaint herein. (Record at 44-65.) 
3. The policies specifically exclude personal liability 
coverage for injury arising out of business pursuits of an 
insured. The Homeowners Policy, at page 13 of 18, excludes 
injury "arising out of or in connection with a business engaged 
in by an insured." (Record at 52.) The Umbrella Policy, at page 
5 of 6, excludes injury "arising from . . . a business 
activity . . . " (Record at 64.) 
4. In the underlying action, Karen Burns McCoy alleges 
that Russell P. Calame "wrote and published a book for the 
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purpose of obtaining profit . • . ." (Underlying Action, 
paragraph 71). (Record at 26.) 
5. For 25 years, from 1947 to 1972, Calame was an FBI 
agent. (Calame depo, p 4f lines 3-9) 
6. Since 19 72 Calame has been self-employed doing 
"investigative work." (Calame depo, p 4, line 13 to p 5, line 3) 
7. One Bernie A. Rhodes wanted to write a book about the 
two airplane hijacking cases of D.B. Cooper and Richard F. McCoy, 
Jr. (Calame depo, pp 13-16) 
8. Rhodes and Calame entered into an oral agreement, later 
memorialized in the written Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". [Addendum, Tab A] (Calame depo, pp 25, 31-33, 35-37 and 
Calame depo Exhibit 1) Said Agreement recites that it was entered 
into voluntarily by Rhodes and Calame "in connection with their 
joint effort and endeavor to produce a book suitable for 
publication concerning the skyjackings by Richard Floyd McCoy in 
1972 and an individual generally spoken of as D.B. Cooper in 
1971." Said Agreement further recites that "Calame would handle 
the research and investigation necessary to establish and verify 
the facts and details as much as possible." Said Agreement 
further recited that "If the book produced any revenue . . . any 
monies available would be paid out on the basis of 75% to Rhodes 
as the author and 25% to Calame as the researcher. This split 
shall apply to any monies received from the endeavor . . . " 
(Emphasis added.) 
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9. Rhodes had an agreement with the publisher, the 
University of Utah Press, that provides for 10% royalties on case 
bound copies and 7,5% on paperback copies. (Calame depo, pp 43-
46, and depo Exhibit 2 at paragraph 13, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B".) [Addendum, Tab B]. 
10. A copy of the dust cover of the book is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C", and the dust cover recites "research by Russell 
Calame." (Calame depo, p 49, lines 5-13, and depo Exhibit 3). 
[Addendum, Tab C]. 
11. Within the month of August 1992 Calame expected to 
receive $850 to $900 as monies from the endeavor. (Calame depo, 
p. 38, lines 17-19) 
8. Summary of the argument. 
Calame was engaged in a business pursuit. The business 
pursuit exclusions in the USAA policies clearly and unambiguously 
exclude coverage for business pursuits. USAA was entitled to 
summary judgment that Calame had no coverage in the underlying 
action, and that USAA owed him no duty to defend. 
9. Detail of the argument. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
USAA WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT THE ACTS OF CALAME OF WHICH MCCOY 
COMPLAINS IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION WERE A 
BUSINESS PURSUIT NOT COVERED UNDER CALAME'S 
POLICIES WITH USAA, AND THAT USAA HAS NO DUTY 
TO DEFEND CALAME. 
The Statement of Facts set forth above clearly establishes 
that Calame was involved in a business pursuit. This is not a 
case of first impression in the State of Utah. In Fire Insurance 
Exchange v. Alsop. 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the primary purpose of a homeowners policy is 
to provide package coverage for exposures incidental to home 
ownership, and not to provide malpractice, professional, or 
business liability insurance. 
In Alsop. the insured was a chiropractor who rendered 
treatment to a pregnant woman during labor and delivery of her 
baby. The mother and child were injured because of complications 
in the delivery. The mother sued for malpractice. The chiro-
practor sought coverage under his homeowners policy. The 
insurance company sought and obtained a declaratory judgment from 
the trial court that there was no coverage. The insured 
appealed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
judge. The Court stated that neither the activity nor the policy 
language should be viewed in isolation, but should be looked at 
into in light of practical common sense in relation to the 
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pertinent circumstances. The Court held in favor of the insurer, 
denying coverage because of the business pursuit exclusion. 
Calame's brief on appeal presents a few cases from other 
jurisdictions, Minnesota, Kentucky, Georgia, Texas and Illinois, 
that have found against insurers on business pursuit exclusions. 
These cases, however, are not Utah cases and would have been 
decided differently under the Alsop principle that the primary 
purpose of a homeowner's policy is to provide coverage for 
exposures incidental to home ownership, not to provide malprac-
tice, professional, or business liability insurance. Moreover, 
for every such non-Utah case, there is at least another non-Utah 
case upholding the business pursuits exclusion. For example, in 
addition to the cases discussed in Point II, below, Liberty 
Mutual•Insurance Company v. Miller, 549 S.2d 1200 (DCA Fl, 1989) 
involved an insured doctor confronting a fellow physician regard-
ing care and treatment of a mutual patient in which the insured 
doctor pulled on the fellow physician's stethoscope while it was 
draped around her neck. Liberty Mutual prevailed on a declara-
tory judgment that its homeowner's policy did not provide 
coverage. The appellate court found that the injury arose out of 
a business pursuit. 
USAA v. Schneider, 620 F. Supp. 246 (D.C.N.Y. 1985), is a 
very interesting case in which USAA prevailed on a declaratory 
judgment against the infamous tennis pro John McEnroe that 
McEnroe's altercation with a spectator at one of his matches 
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arose out of a business pursuit and was excluded from coverage 
under McEnroe's homeowners policy with USAA. 
In West American Insurance Company v. California Mutual 
Insurance Company. 240 Cal.Rptr. 540 (C.A., Second Dist. 1987), 
the appellate court found that the business pursuit exclusion 
"logically includes any activity which arises from and is in the 
course of an employee's employment," and that this exclusion even 
attached where the insured's employees were injured in a Friday 
afternoon altercation at the insured's home after playing pool 
and dice and drinking beer. 
The lead Utah case of Alsop. plus many cases from other 
jurisdictions, hold that when an insured is engaged in a business 
pursuit it is entirely proper for the trial court to grant 
summary judgment that there is no coverage and no duty to defend. 
This is the result that should attach to this case. The lower 
court properly entered judgment declaring no coverage and no duty 
to defend. 
POINT II 
CALAME'S WORK ON D.B. COOPER, THE REAL MCCOY, 
WAS AN ACTIVITY INCIDENTAL TO CALAME'S 
"TRADE, PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION," AND WAS, 
THEREFORE, A BUSINESS PURSUIT. 
The business pursuit exclusion in Calame's homeowner's 
policy excludes claims "arising out of or in connection with a 
business engaged in by an insured." "Business" is defined as a 
"trade, profession or occupation." Similarly, the business 
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pursuit exclusion in Calame's umbrella policy excludes claims 
arising from "the business, profession or occupation of an 
insured." Calame argues that his "trade, profession or occu-
pation" is not that of a book researcher and that, accordingly, 
the business pursuit exclusions do not apply to preclude coverage 
of those claims arising out of Calame's work on D.B. Cooper, The 
Real McCoy. But Calame's work on the book was incidental to his 
profession as an FBI agent and private investigator and accord-
ingly, pursuant to the business pursuit exclusions, there is no 
coverage and no duty to defend on the part of USAA. 
The controlling rule of law that should be applied in this 
case is that the insured will be found to have been engaged in a 
business pursuit when his activity is "incidental to his 
employment." American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nickerson, 813 
F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting North River Ins. Co. v. 
Poos. 553 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Mo.Ct.App. 1977) (bodily injury claim 
arising from bite by a wolf kept and cared for at the insured's 
residence was excluded from coverage under policy excluding 
injuries arising out of insured's business pursuits, in that 
insured's keeping and caring for wolf at his residence was 
incidental to insured's employment). Calame was an FBI agent 
from 1947 to 1972 and since then has been a private investigator. 
He was admittedly sought out to work on the book, D.B. Cooper, 
The Real McCoy, because of the substantial knowledge he had 
gained as an FBI agent. Certainly, his research for the book was 
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incidental to his former work as an FBI agent and his ongoing 
work as a private investigator. 
In Davis v. Fredericks, Inc., 517 P.2d 1014 (Utah 1973), an 
off-duty employee went out the rear door of a cafe. As he swung 
open the door, it knocked down a woman passing by. The defendant 
employer, hoping for some insurance money to pay the woman's 
damages, argued that because the employee was off-duty, the act 
of walking out the door was a non-business activity and was 
covered under a homeowners policy. The Utah Supreme Court 
disagreed, stating that the activity was incidental to the 
business, and as such was not covered under the homeowners 
policy. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge, who had 
determined there was no coverage. 
Calame argues that in order to qualify as a business 
pursuit, the activity of the insured must be regularly engaged in 
with the idea of earning a livelihood or living. But, in 
Nickerson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
reasoned decision of the trial court that "profit motive is 
irrelevant to a business pursuits determination when the 
questioned conduct is incidental to the insured's regular 
employment." Nickerson, 813 F.2d at 137. In Nickerson, the 
insurer brought an action seeking declaration of its rights under 
a homeowner's policy issued to a policeman. The trial court 
held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the insurer had no 
duty to defend or indemnify the insured policeman who, while off 
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duty, shot a motorist in a car near the insured's home. The off-
duty officer suspected the motorist was involved in a recent 
incidence of burglaries in his neighborhood. The insured argued 
that he was acting incidental to his status as a homeowner, 
father and neighbor. The court rejected this argument and relied 
upon the officer's own invocation of his official authority when 
he approached the motorist, and the police manual imposing on 
officers the obligation to respond to suspected criminal 
activity, even when off duty. 
Here Calame used and employed the skills and knowledge he 
obtained as an officer of the FBI, and cultivated as a private 
investigator, to establish and verify the facts and details of 
the book. Therefore, the activity was incidental to his regular 
employment and it is immaterial that Calame did not undertake the 
assignment and contract with Rhodes as the sole means of earning 
a living. It is worth reiterating, however, that Calame actively 
sought, and successfully obtained, a written contract right to 
receive 25% of all the revenue the book produced. His efforts 
cannot be said to be without profit motive. 
Desormeaux v. Romero, 560 S.2d 658 (La.Ct.App. 1990), is a 
case factually similar to the case at bar. There, the insured, a 
private investigator, brought an action against the insurer to 
establish that the insurer had a duty to defend in a suit brought 
against the insured for damages arising out of his alleged 
defamatory statements. The homeowner's policy issued by Valley 
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Forge Insurance Company, and at issue in Desormeaux, excluded 
coverage of claims arising out of the business pursuits of the 
insured. The Valley Forge policy defined "business" precisely 
the same way it is defined in the policy at issue here. In that 
case, the insured was allegedly hired to attempt the release of a 
convicted felon whose family claimed had been framed. As part of 
the alleged attempt to release the prisoner, the insured was made 
a deputy sheriff in order to further his investigation. The 
allegations were that in the course of the insured's employment 
as a private investigator, and in conjunction with his 
investigative activities undertaken for the sheriff's office, the 
insured had made defamatory statements. The Louisiana Court of 
Appeals held that these allegations were "unambiguously" excluded 
from coverage under the homeowner's policy issued to the insured 
by Valley Forge, and that Valley Forge had no duty to furnish a 
defense to the insured. Id. at 660. 
Several cases from California indicate that an activity 
which is not connected with the primary occupation of the 
insured, or which may occur on a one-time basis, is nevertheless 
properly excluded as an excluded business pursuit. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Drasin. 152 Cal.App. 3d 864, 199 Cal.Rptr. 749 
(2d Dist. 1984), for example, involves an attorney who was 
involved in a limited partnership. After his suit against 
another partner failed, Drasin was sued for malicious prosecu-
tion. Drasin contended that his involvement in the partnership 
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activities, since not in his capacity as an attorney, were not 
business pursuits under his homeowners exclusion. The court 
disagreed. After noting that part-time or supplemental income 
projects had been considered "business pursuits" by other courts 
and authorities, the court concluded: 
"The Drasins, as stated in their own words, are engaged 
in the partnership for profit and had been engaged in 
such partnership for more than a year. As such, they 
were engaged in a business pursuit. Therefore, the 
Business Pursuit Exclusionary Clause applies." £d. at 
753. 
Smyth v. USAA, 5 Cal.App. 4th 1470, 7 Cal.Rptr. 2d 694 (2d 
Dist. 1992), involved the insured's activities as an outside 
director of a corporation and USAA's homeowners and umbrella 
policies. Smyth was sued because of injuries suffered in a hotel 
fire at a hotel owned by the corporation on whose board Smyth was 
a director. The court assumed there was no profit motive in 
being a director and that Smyth in fact received no compensation. 
The court found the insured had no reasonable expectation of 
coverage under the policies. The court stated: "Such activities 
cannot be considered 'usual to non-business pursuits.'" Id. at 
697. Regarding the lack of profit motive, the court wrote: 
"Regardless how benevolent Smyth's own motivations were 
or how minimal his involvement, the activity involved 
is a business activity subject to exclusion under these 
policies." Id. at 697. (Emphasis added). 
California Mutual Ins. Co. v. Robertsons, 262 Cal.Rptr. 173 
(Cal.App. 5th Dist. 1989), involved insureds who were sued for 
negligently supervising their agent in certain real estate 
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investment transactions. The court concluded that this part-time 
activity conducted through an agent whom they had used on two or 
three occasions for investments, constituted a business pursuit 
under the homeowners exclusion. Regarding the part-time nature 
of the activity, the court stated: 
"The business engaged in need not be the sole occupa-
tion; part-time business activities are also included 
under a business pursuits exclusion." Id. at 179. 
Calame now says that he did not consider his involvement 
with the book part of his private investigation business. The 
undisputed facts are, however, that Calame, for well more than a 
decade, had been in the business of private investigations (see 
Calame's own undisputed fact number 2) (Record at 111), and that 
his tasks that got him sued by Ms. McCoy included "research of 
newspaper clippings and other documents" and conducting 
"interviews of people with knowledge of the crimes" (see Calame's 
own undisputed fact number 8) (Record at 113). Calame's own 
undisputed facts establish that what he did was part of his 
private business, and that what he did was "investigation." 
Calame now says that he "never opened a file on the matter," but 
his own undisputed facts establish that he researched newspaper 
clippings and other documents, conducted interviews of people 
with knowledge of the crimes, and entered into the written 
contract that is attached in the Addendum at Tab A. Calame 
claims that he didn't bill Rhodes or anyone else or itemize or 
charge anyone for expenses. However, his written contractual 
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agreement with Rhodes, Addendum at Tab A, specifically addresses 
how Calame was going to get paid--he didn't need to keep track of 
his time or itemize or charge anyone for expenses. 
Calame claims he never expected the book to generate any 
revenue, but the claim is irrelevant. Calame himself testified 
that the reason he entered into the contract with Rhodes was so 
that his heirs would be protected and wouldn't have to fight over 
the money. (Calame depo, page 53, line 18 to page 5 line 10.) 
In any event, Calame's own undisputed fact 14 establishes that he 
did in fact receive revenue from his efforts. (Record at 114.) 
In our case, the lower court properly ruled that Calame's 
research on the book D.B. Cooper, The Real McCoy was a business 
pursuit. It was appropriate for the lower court to grant summary 
judgment that there is, therefore, no coverage and no duty to 
defend. 
POINT III 
THE BUSINESS PURSUIT EXCLUSIONS CLEARLY AND 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY PRECLUDE COVERAGE. 
The business pursuit exclusions are clear and unambiguous 
and preclude coverage in this case. See Black v. Fireman's Fund 
American Ins. Co., 767 P.2d 824, 827 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) 
("Construing the language of the policy according to its plain 
and ordinary meaning, we believe the intent and purpose of the 
[business pursuit] exclusion are clear."). But even if the 
language of the exclusions were ambiguous, "it would not mean 
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that coverage automatically existed. Rather, the question would 
be whether any reasonable interpretation of the 'business 
pursuit' exclusion would fail to encompass the [activity]. . . ." 
Id. Based upon the foregoing argument, USAA maintains that 
Calame's work on the book D.B. Cooper, The Real McCoy, would be 
excluded under any reasonable interpretation of the insurance 
policy's provisions. 
Calame cites several Utah cases for the proposition that 
ambiguities in insurance contracts should be construed against 
the insurer and in favor of coverage. Granted this is the 
general rule, but those cases do not, however, address the 
ambiguity or plain and ordinary meaning of business pursuit 
exclusions in standard homeowner's policies. Further, as stated, 
the rule has no application when the language is clear and 
unambiguous, as it is here. 
Calame offers a letter from an "expert" as to the "expert's" 
"opinion" as to the "intent" of the business pursuit exclusion. 
The concept of introducing letters from "experts" as to their 
"opinions" as to the "intent" of languages in insurance policies 
is fallacious. First, the opinion is irrelevant and immaterial 
if the policy language is, as here, clear and unambiguous. 
Second, as anyone who has worked in the American judicial system 
for more than about five days knows, if one has $500, one can 
obtain any "expert" "opinion" one desires. Third, if insurers 
and insureds were to determine the "intent" of policies, an 
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extremely unwise proposition in the first place, by resorting to 
"opinions" of hired "experts," no insurer or insured would ever 
know what they had bargained for without resort to the judicial 
system and the concomitant purchased opinions of experts. The 
letter of Mr. Kahn offering his "opinion" as to the "intent" of 
the applicable policies is irrelevant and immaterial, and was 
correctly disregarded by the trial court. The business pursuit 
exclusions at issue here clearly and unambiguously preclude 
coverage. 
Mr. Kahn's opinions are irrelevant and immaterial. It is 
irrelevant and immaterial what Mr. Kahn thinks the "intention" of 
the business pursuits exclusion is. The policy is clear and 
unambiguous on its face. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court 
has a vastly different opinion of the purpose of the business 
exclusion in a homeowner's policy. As discussed above, in Fire 
Insurance Exchange v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985), the Court 
stated that the primary purpose of a homeowner's policy is to 
provide package coverage for exposures incidental to home 
ownership, and not to provide malpractice, professional or 
business liability insurance. It is impossible to see how 
Mr, Calame's activity that got him sued was incidental to home 
ownership, and clearly it was not. The exclusions are clear and 
unambiguous, and preclude coverage in this case. 
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10. Conclusion containing a statement of the relief sought. 
The lower court properly concluded that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact, that on the undisputed material 
facts USAA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that, 
because of the applicable business pursuit exclusions from 
coverage, Calame had no coverage under his policy with USAA, and 
that USAA had no duty to defend Calame in the underlying Karen 
Burns McCoy action. The Order and Judgment of the lower court 
should be affirmed. . 
DATED this day of October, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
USAA 
RHH596 
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ADDENDUM 
Tab A - Calame/Rhodes "Contractual Agreement" 
Tab B - University of Utah Press Memorandum of Agreement 
Tab C - "D.B. Cooper - The Real McCoy" dust cover 
Tab D - The lower court's Memorandum Decision* 
Tab E - The Order and Judgment 
*The parties agree that the lower court's Memorandum Decision 
mistakenly refers to Calame as defendant and USAA as plaintiff, 
See Appellate's Brief at page 8, footnote 2. 
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Tab A 
Contractural Agreement-
This agreement is* entered into voluntarily by Bernie* A. Rhodes 
and Russell~P. Calame in connection with their joint effort and endeavor 
to produce a book suitable for publication concerning the skyjackings 
by Richard Ployd McCoy in 1972 and an individual generally spoken of 
as D. B. Cooper, in 1971- For the purposes of this agreement, the V 
following is set'forthi 
Rhodes first talked about writing a book on these sky packings in about 
the mid 1970fs and asked Calame if he would be interested in helping, 
Calame said he would* 
During the years 1983 and 1984, Rhodes prepared about 100 pages of 
manuscript which was furnished to Calame in about early I985 for 
his observations and suggestions. Calame reviewed the material 
and made several observations. 
In 1985, Rhodes and Calame discussed further work.on the intended book; 
it was agreed that Rhodes would continue in the writing and Calame 
would handle the research and investigation necessary to establish 
and verify the facts and "details as much as'possible. They agreed 
they would each keep a record of expenses attributable to -this 
endeavor; further, they agreed neither of them would submit any 
charges' or costs due to the personal time expended by them. 
Further, they agreed that If the book produced any revenue, each 
would it'emize his expenses and these would be paid first. Thereafter, 
any monies available would be paid out on the basis of 75£ to Rhodes 
as the author and 25^ to Calame as the researcher. This'split 
shall apply to any monies received from the endeavor,, whether it 
is from a book, hard and/or soft cover, -movie, TV broadcast, serial-
izations of programs or other form. Further, if there are any 
costs due to the use of an Agent to sell or promote this endeavor, 
the costs of such Agent will be apportioned 75£ payable by Rhodes and 
25^ payable by Calame. 
In 1987, Rhodes and Calame paid for the transportation .of Kelvin 
Dale Walter from Houston to Salt Lake City and return and further, 
paid Walker for* some written data he furnished. At the time of 
meeting with Walker, it was agreed Walker would be given a written 
contract to be executed by Rhodes and Walker. This contract is in 
preparation. When completed and signed by both parties, it will be 
made a part of this agreement, since it also involves Calame. 
At the time the oral agreement was entered into in I985 by Rhodes and 
Calame, neither felt the need to reduce the agreement to writing. Now, 
because of advancing age, the possible time delay in publication and 
the uncertainties of life itself, both'desire that a written agreement 
and contract should be entered into .and therefore, i^^irthepance of 
this desiret each has in the pr^ seTTC'e^ oi* witnesses,/signed ^ibw. 
R OOOOi 
Witnessi 
Witnes-j 
. * 
TOP 
Russell P. Calame, 4411 Parkview Drive 
Salt Lake 'City, Utah 8412k 
James A. Stewart 
Roger D. Sandack 
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TEE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH YtfESS 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
Author's Grant 
Author's 
Warranty 
Delivery of 
Manuscript 
This Agreement is made as of September 5, 1990 by and between Bernie 
Rhodes (hereinafter called the Author, and if there is more than one author 
then all of them collectively) and the University of Utah Press, a division of 
the University of Utah, located at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(hereinafter called the Publisher), to publish and market a book now entitled 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT CD. B. COOPER - NO LONGER A MYSTERY) 
(hereinafter called the Vork). 
THE AUTHOR AND THE PUBLISHER AGREE AS F0LL0VS: 
1. The Author hereby grants, assigns, and transfers to the Publisher the 
exclusive right to manufacture and publish the Vork and all rights to 
the Vork, including but without limitation all common law rights, 
copyrights, and the right to secure copyright in the United States and 
all other countries of the world in the name of the Publisher, together 
with the exclusive right to sell the Vork during -the term of such 
copyright in all languages throughout the world. 
2. The Author warrants that he or she is the sole author and proprietor 
of the Vork and has full power to make this agreement; that the Vork 
has "not been published except as may be stated in paragraph 21 of this 
Agreement; that the Vork does not infringe any copyright or violate 
any proprietary rights, or contain any scandalous or libelous matter, 
or invade the privacy of any person; and that no right in the Vork has 
in any way been sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of, and that 
the Vork is free from all liens and claims. The Author agrees to defend, 
indemnify, and to hold harmless the Publisher against all claims, 
demands, suits, ' losses, damages, costs, and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, that the Publisher may sustain or incur from 
any breach of the Author's warranties and representations 
hereunder. 
3. The Author shall deliver the complete manuscript of the Vork not later 
than X5 December 1990. "Manuscript" shall be understood to mean text 
and all art (defined as photographs, drawings, maps, charts, graphs, 
tables and other illustrative material) to be included in the Vork. If the 
Author shall fail to make delivery by that date, the Publisher shall be 
released from all obligations under this Agreement unless it has advised 
the Author in writing of its willingness to postpone the delivery date; 
but the Author shall not be free to cause or permit publication of the 
Vork elsewhere before reoffering it to the Publisher under the terms 
of this Agreement. 
4. The manuscript shall consist of approximately 450 double-spaced 
typewritten pages of ten and 20 black-and-white photographs. 
5. The Author shall supply the text of the manuscript electronically coded 
on IBH/M5 DOS-compatible word processing disks, accompanied by a 
single hard copy produced therefrom; and shall supply art in draft 
form suitable for editing. 
Content of 
•Manuscript 
Form of Manu-
script 
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Permissions 
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The Author shall obtain all permissions and pay all permission fees for 
the use of text or art controlled by others, and shall supply the 
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I\_^isher with written evidence of V >^ copyright owners' authorization 
to use the materials at the time the manuscript is delivered. 
Acceptance and 
Agreement to 
Publish 
CODV Editing 
find Proof-
reading 
Author's 
Alterations 
Index 
Protection of 
the Vork 
Statements of 
SaJes 
Royalties 
Royalty-free 
copies 
7. Following formal acceptance of the Vork by the Faculty Advisory 
Committee of the University of Utah Press, the Publisher shall publish 
the Vork at its own expense vrtthin a reasonable time in such form as 
it deems best suited for sale of the Vork. 
8» The Publisher shall copyedit the manuscript and send it to the Author 
for reading and correction. The Author shall return the corrected 
manuscript to the Publisher within four weeks. At this time the Author 
shall supply all art previously submitted In draft form in final form 
suitable for reproduction. This will be the Author's final opportunity 
to see the manuscript and to make changes without cost. After the text 
of the manuscript has been set in type, the Author will read and correct 
galley proofs, and return these to the Publisher within three weeks. 
The Publisher will read and correct page proofs; these will not be sent 
to the Author. 
9. The cost of alterations made in the proofs by the Author (exclusive of 
Publisher's errors) shall be charged to the Author. 
10. If the Vork is to contain an index, the Publisher will prepare one at 
its own expense. 
11. The Author shall not publish or furnish to any other publisher without 
the Publisher's written consent any version of the Vork or any work 
of a similar character tending to conflict with the sale of the Vork 
covered by this Agreement, 
12. Following publication of the Vork, the Publisher shall submit to the 
Author, on or before the last day of August each year, statements of 
the number of copies of the Vork sold during the preceding July l to 
June 30 year. 
13. At the time of submitting such statements of sales, the Publisher shall 
pay the Author, after deducting all expenses .chargeable to the Author, 
the following royalties based on the net sales of the Vork (net sales 
being defined as sales, less returns, at list price less standard 
discounts) and accrued to the account of the Author during the 
preceding July 1 to June 30 year: 
On case bound copies: 10%. 
On paperback copies: 7-1/2X. 
14. No royalty shall be paid on any copies lost or destroyed, or on damaged 
or overstocked copies sold at or below manufacturing cost, or on cones 
given away for the purpose of rflding the sale of the Vork, or on cooies 
given or sold to the Author. 
Subsidiary 
Rights 
R 00003 
15. The Author grants and assigns to the Publisher the full, sole, and 
exclusive right to arrange for the sale or licensing of the rights to *ne 
Vorki including but without limitation book club rights; reprint r.f*\s. 
foreign rights; translation rights; serial rights; selection, ebndfae-t 
condensation, digest and adaptation rights; syndication rights; dra z** .r 
motion picture, and television rights; broadcast rights; recordir.f r * -* < 
electronic transmission, storage and retrieval rights; mechan:ra *• j 
visual reproduction rights; and permission rights (quotations, exr<*-; • v 
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Author's, Copies 
TgrtmnaHnn 
Notification 
Duration of 
Agreement 
Assignment 
Special 
Provjsjpng 
xUV^^ti0113^ The net amount of anx^mpensation received from such 
disposition will be divided equally between Author and Publisher (after 
all ipanufacturing costs, commissions, foreign taxes, and other charges 
have been deducted) in lieu of royalties. 
16. The Publisher shall give .the Author & total of 15 free copies of the 
Vork. The Author shall have the right to purchase additional copies 
of the Vork for personal use only, and not for resale, at a discount of 
forty percent (40%) from list price. 
17. If the Publisher falls to keep the work in print and fails to reprint 
within six months of the Author's written request to do so, then the 
Author may terminate this Agreement by written notice, and all rights 
granted to the Publisher shall revert to the Author. Vithin thirty days 
of such termination, the Author shall have the right to purchase, at" 
twenty-five percent of oost, the plates or film of the Vork. should any 
then exist, and to purchase at actual manufacturing cost any. copies 
and/or sheets of the Vork remaining with the Publisher. Thereafter the 
Publisher may dispose of this material at its discretion without liability 
to the Author. 
18. ' All notices which may be proper and necessary for the parties hereto 
to serve on each other may be served effectually in writing by mail at 
the last-known post-office address of either party. 
19. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of both parties, and shall 
continue for the duration of the original copyright of the Vork, of 
copyrights of all revisions and abridgments, and of all renewals 
thereof. 
20. This Agreement may be assigned by either party with the written 
consent of the other, and the assignee thereof shall have* all of'the 
rights and remedies of the original parties. But this Agreement shall 
be assigned only as a whole and not as a part, and may not be assigned 
as to any part interest therein. 
21. None. 
INVTTNESS VHEREOjvtbe parties hereunder have caused this instrument to 
day and year first hereinabove written. 
Author 2 
R 0 0 0 0 4 Author 3 
AUTHOR INFORMATION (required for ooDvritfht registration): 
•<€& -ft 
ignature Authorized S
University of Utah 
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Author .1 M &** Social Security No. V&T-cJTb V ^ £ Home Address: Citizenship *?/S~* ^^tf/f//&,ie AJ)^ 
Date of Birth <S~-S=-^tSL- S C C -yj1^ /rV/d^T 
Author 2 Social Security No. 
Citi2enship _ _ _ _ _ 
Date of Birth 
Home Address: 
Author 3 Social Security No. _ 
Citizenship _ _ _ _ _ 
Date of Birth, 
Home Address: 
R 00005 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Russell P. Calame, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : 
: CASE NO: 920902185 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
United Services Automobile Association, : 
Defendant. : 
Now before the Court are plaintiff and defendant's Cross Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The Court has reviewed the memos filed in connection with the motions, has heard 
oral argument and having taken the matter under advisement now rules as follows: 
The Court will not repeat the facts of this matter as they have been thoroughly outlined 
in the memos and are well known to the parties. Plaintiff claims that the injury complained of 
in the underlying tort action arose out of defendant's business pursuits and is therefore excluded 
from coverage under his home owners policy of insurance. Defendant responds that his efforts 
at researching for the book in question was not a business pursuit within the meaning of the 
exclusionary language of the policy and that since his activities were not a part of his regularly 
conducted profession, by means of which he earned his livelihood, the insurance policy's 
business exclusion does not apply. 
The Court is of the opinion that when defendant entered into a contract to do research 
and investigation to establish and verify facts in a joint effort to produce a book suitable for 
publication, and where the contract outlined each parties share of any revenues that may be 
C0280 
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received from the sale of the book that defendant was clearly engaging in a business activity. 
Defendant claims, however, that his research and investigation for the book, was not part 
of his regularly conducted activity by which he earns his livelihood. The Court is of the opinion 
that there is no significant distinction between his efforts at researching and investigating facts 
to be included in this book and his investigations for clients in a variety of other kinds of 
matters. The fact that this investigation may have been for himself in his joint effort to produce 
a book rather than for a third party client is not a significant fact. 
The Court is further of the opinion that in order for the exclusion to apply the business 
engaged in need not be the sole occupation of the insured. Part time activities may also be 
included within the exclusionary language of the policy if those activities are indeed legitimate 
business pursuits. Inasmuch as Mr. Caiame's efforts in this matter were clearly in pursuit of 
a business interest the Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language applies and 
accordingly grants plaintiffs Motion and denies defendant's Motion. 
The Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language is not ambiguous, and 
therefore feels that Mr. Kahn's affidavit is immaterial and will grant the Motion to Strike. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it in 
accordance with the local rules of practice. 
Dated t h i s ^ / ( day of April, 1993. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge I *£. %£-y?^ v * 
G 0 2 S 1 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a trae and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this Q-/ day of April, 1993. 
Carman E. Kipp 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
vf*s<, (\yfl^>j9,A . 
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL P. CALAME, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE Civil No. 920902135 
ASSOCIATION, 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Defendant. 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial 
Administration. The Court having thoroughly reviewed the file, 
including the cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Memoranda, 
and the Court having fully heard oral argument, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises: 
The Court is of the opinion that when Russell P. Calame 
entered into a contract to do research and investigation to 
establish and verify facts in a joint effort to produce a book 
suitable for publication, and where the contract outlined each 
party's share of any revenues that may be received from the sale 
'• • •••
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of the book that Russell P. Calame was clearly engaging in a 
business activity. 
The Court is of the opinion that there is no significant 
distinction between Russell P. Calame!s efforts at researching 
and investigating facts to be included in this book and his 
investigations for clients in a variety of other kinds of 
matters. The fact that this investigation may have been for 
himself in his joint effort to produce a book rather than for a 
third-party client is not a significant fact. 
The Court is further of the opinion that in order for 
exclusion to apply to business engaged in need not be the sole 
occupation of the insured. Part time activities may also be 
included within the exclusionary language of the policy if those 
activities are indeed legitimate business pursuits. Inasmuch as 
Richard P. Calamefs efforts in this matter were clearly in 
pursuit of a business interest, the Court is of the opinion that 
the exclusionary language applies. 
The Court is of the opinion that the exclusionary language 
is not ambiguous. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. That USAAfs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mr. Kahn 
be, and hereby is granted; 
2. That USAA's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby 
is granted; 
-
2
- co::M 
3. That Russell P. Calamefs Motion for Summary Judgment be, 
and hereby is denied. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered in favor of USAA and 
against Russell P. Calame, no cause of action, and that the acts 
of which Karen Burns McCoy complains in the underlying action are 
not covered under Russell P. Calame's insurance policy with USAA, 
and that USAA has no duty to defend Russell P. Calame in the 
underlying action.
 y A A, 
DATED this ik day of~Apr±T*, 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
FRANK G. 
DISTRICT 
-3-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed ORDER 
AND JUDGMENT (Case Number 920902135, Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County) upon the parties listed below 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Carman E. Kipp 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
and causing the same to be hand-delivered on the 29th day of 
April, 1993. 
Donna Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 29th day of April, 
1993. 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this day of October, 1993, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to the following: 
Carman E. Kipp 
Kirk G. Gibbs 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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